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protect a carrier task force against a na-
tion with a blue-water submarine capa-
bility, but a mix of Seawolf-type and lit-
toral design submarines will better meet 
the total mission requirements, at a much 
lower cost. 
Commander Peppe states that the U.S. 
Navy's "4,300 reactor years of safe op-
eration ... is the envy of civil and mili-
tary reactor programs worldwide." This 
may be true but will mean nothing if we 
have an accident similar to the Russian 
Mike submarine that sunk in the North 
Sea (still causing environmental damage). 
U.S. Navy submariners refuse to look at 
the history of our surface combatants op-
erating in littoral zones and being se- . 
verely damaged by military force (e.g., 
missiles, mines, bombs, and guns), and 
seem to think they are invincible. A U.S. 
SSN detected in shallow water is sus-
ceptible to a reactor breech caused by a 
500-pound bomb. Bringing a nuclear-
powered submarine into shallow water 
where we can suffer a "Whiskey on the 
Rocks" incident, or create a nuclear dis-
aster that results in nuclear contamina-
tion of a shallow-water ocean area has to 
be balanced with the perceived require-
ment to keep all submarines nuclear pow-
ered. In addition, deploying a diesel or 
air-independent-propulsion submarine 
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"Riding Shotgun" F4U1D Corsair (20 x 26) 
Flown by Major Archie Donahue USMC-flight leader with 
14 victories in 6 missions-and the CV-17 USS Bunker Hill 
equipped with the technological advances 
planned for the current NSSN will not 
only provide our country with the world's 
finest submarines well into the next cen-
tury, but will do it cheaper as well.• 
"Maneuvering Past Maneuver 
Warfare" 
(See E.B. Atkeson, pp. 33-35, January I 996 
Proceedings) 
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. U.S. Navy 
(Retired}--I am writing to warn off Navy 
folks who may think Ted Atkeson is just 
another shallow Army guy who doesn't 
understand how a Navy does its job when 
he says we have followed "the siren song 
of maneuver warfare." He is mostly right. 
In uniform, General Atkeson had one of 
the Army's most creative minds. Among 
his longstanding interests are operational 
art, doctrine, and combat theory. 
General Atkeson is right that the naval 
services' concept of maneuver warfare 
has not yet been developed as workable 
doctrine. I have been trying to do that, 
and so have others, including the Naval 
Doctrine Command. To get beyond the 
generalities is not easy, and General Atke-
son is very helpful in pointing out the 
flimsiness of doctrine by slogan, along 
with the U.S. Army's experience. 
He is particularly acute in showing that 
maneuver enthusiasts are prone to em-
brace all actions that have been seen to 
work and eschew all that have not. These 
military reformers have defined maneu-
ver warfare so that the opposite must be 
stupid warfare. General Atkeson is right 
about the shallowness of the OODA (ob-
serve, orient, decide, act) loop. He might 
say that maneuver warfare is illustrated 
by air combat, in which the pilot with an 
OODA loop advantage shoots down the 
enemy-which is success measured by 
combat attrition. 
When the Navy finally has sorted out 
maneuver warfare, a usable doctrine prob-
ably will put flesh on this skeleton; but 
to understand maneuver warfare, a re-
spectable alternative needs to be de-
scribed. Usually the alternative is attrition 
warfare, as General Atkeson says. A more 
accurate term is "Power Warfare," which 
implies domination through irresistible 
force. In successful power warfare, an 
enemy who fights will be destroyed. • Corollary One: If an intelligent oppo-
nent realizes that he will be destroyed, he 
will choose not to fight-unless his jugu-
lar is threatened. • Corollary Two: He will fight in des-
peration when enough is at stake-as we 
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did at Coral Sea and Midway, although 
we were not destroyed. • Corollary Three: If he fights tena-
ciously, both sides will suffer attrition, 
often severe. The Battles of Tarawa, Iwo 
Jima, and Okinawa illustrate. 
The U.S. Navy can still put irresistible 
force to sea. That we can (to date) dom-
inate any opponent with superior fight-
ing force is the basis of our free move-
ment. Power first, maneuver follows. 
Free movement at sea, whether of naval 
forces (to include Marines) or of cargo, 
is and always has been the most efficient 
way to "maneuver" large quantities. Un-
encumbered movement is the great re-
ward of sea power, as the term was used 
by Mahan and Corbett. It is what is, or 
ought to be, intended by the slogan, Op-
erational Maneuver from the Sea. (It also 
is the noteworthy feature missing from 
General Atkeson's short article.) 
Maneuver warfare applies to the con-
duct of a campaign. Thus, the basis of 
successful maneuver warfare is not inge-
nuity, nor the expectation that an out-
maneuvered enemy will not fight, but 
wise employment of fighting forces so 
that the swift and efficient movement of 
goods and services on the high seas and 
along the littorals can be exploited to 
achieve the strategic ends. One might 
even tum . the usual rhetoric on its head 
and say that fleetness afoot is the effect-
not the cause-of successful naval ma-
neuver warfare. 
Naval maneuver warfare applies to 
campaigns, not to battles. Victory in com-
bat will be attained by attacking effec 0 
tively first. The aim of naval tactics (if 
there is such a thing in these days of 
joint operations on the littorals) was, 
and still is, attrition. One does not achieve 
victory in a sea battle by outmaneuver-
ing the enemy-unless outscouting him 
is synonymous.• 
"Generation X: One 
Wardroom's Perspective" 
(See J. Sharpe, C. Ratliff, and K. Peppe, pp. 28-
32, January 1996 Proceedings) 
Captain E.R. Hebert, U.S. Navy (Re-
tired)-Commander Peppe and Lieu-
tenant Sharpe both seem to lament that 
the Navy is fostering an atmosphere 
where equal opportunity and managerial 
style leadership are dominant themes, 
while good, old-fashioned, shove-it-
down-your-throat power exercises are cast 
aside. Can they be serious? I am sure I 
was not the only reader to be concerned 
by this apparent lack .of appreciation of 
what leadership is, and what "dues" are 
owed to the leaders by the subordinate. 
The only universal laws of leadership 
I have discovered in my 30 years with 
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the U.S. Navy are that the leader reaps 
what he sows; that good commands gen-· 
erally treat people right; and that com-
mands trying to foster blind obedience to 
authority generally proliferate blindness. 
Most of us have no philosophical or prac-
tical difficulty blending Jeffersonian con-
cepts with military requirements. In fact, 
many of us take pride in being part of a 
military where respect is earned and ac-
countability for treatment of subordinates 
is very much a part of our way of life. 
We wouldn't have it any other way. 
In autocratic leadership environments, 
whatever is directed to be done generally 
gets done-but little else is accomplished, 
and innovation and synergistic thinking 
are suppressed. Perhaps this style fits 
some situations where objectives are ex-
tremely limited. I suspect however, that 
on submarines, as on surface ships, there 
are thousands of processes not covered 
by checklists or regulations, where we 
rely on the instincts and knowledge of 
motivated enlisted personnel. I caution 
Commander Peppe and Lieutenant Sharpe 
to widen the apertures of their 
periscopes-or else they may get ex-
actly what they have asked for.• 
"The B-lB: In Memoriam" 
(See E.E. Riccioni, pp.41-44 January 1996 
Proceedings) 
Scott L. White, B-1B Program, Rockwell 
International Corporation-As a dedi-
cated reader of Proceedings and one who 
depends on factual data for decision mak-
ing and strategic development, I was 
profoundly disappointed with Colonel 
Riccioni's article. It not only misrepre-
sents the B-lB, but I believe it misrep-
resents the mission of Proceedings by 
publishing factual errors, out of context 
statements, and politically motivated sar-
casm. This type of article causes me to 
question the remaining content of 
Proceedings for which I do not have such 
intimate knowledge. Your credibility and 
position as a leading publication of 
defense informiltion have been signifi-
cantly tarnished.• 
Rear Admiral Paul T. Gillerist, U.S. Navy 
(Retired)-My first reaction to Colonel 
Riccioni's article was that this is some-
how a follow-on to Mr. Di Rita's satire 
of a few months ago-but not so. This is 
for real! 
I have kept closer to the details of 
both the B-1 and B-2 programs than most 
retired naval officers probably do . 
Nonetheless, I was astonished that one 
person, and a retired Air Force officer 
at that, could get so many facts wrong or 
confused about those two programs! 
Direct from Russia, the same 8-day ship's clocks 
found on Soviet nuclear submarines in a special, 
limited edition version! Precision , 12-jewel 
movement sealed in aluminum alloy housing , 
waterproof to 2,000' & able to withstand depth charge 
concussions. Polished brass faceplate, face displays 
Red October™ sub breaking through water's surface, 
Soviet hammer & sickle with red star at 12 o'clock, 
marine anchor at 6 o'clock, Russian words "Red 
October"'" & "Made in USSR" on face. Each clock 
individually numbered, weighs a whopping 6 pounds 
& comes in its own box with wall mounting plate, 
winding key & original factory documents with serial 
number! Sensational price of s59~· 
Hurry Comrade, Q11a11tities Limited! 
SOVIETSKl"~COLLECTION [m)IZ:d:1 
2171 India St., #P • San Diego, CA 92101 • Fa:t: (619J237-8010 
htt ://www.sovietski.com • E•mai l: fulcrum@sovietski.com 
"Plus $6.95 S/H • WE SHIP WITHIN 24 HOURS! 
Ori inal Russian facto documents & En lish instructions included. 
DID YOU SERVE 
IN THE PACIFIC 
DURING WW II? 
BUYING JAPANESE PRINTS, 
PHILIPPINE PAINTINGS, 
INDONESIAN PAINTINGS BY 




























ARTWORK YOU BOUGHT IN JAPAN 
OR SOUTHEAST ASIA MAY BE 
VALUABLE TODAY! 
PLEASE CALL OR WRITE 
DOUGLAS A. FRAZER FINE ART 
P.O. BOX432 
MEDINA, WA 98039 
(800) 938-0554 
(206) 451-8031 
19 
